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Abstract
The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt created a contagion effect that
inspired a series of uprisings by sending two signals: first, that even
entrenched authoritarian regimes are vulnerable; and second, that
nonviolent tactics can be effective in bringing about dramatic political
changes. Subsequent developments, especially in Libya and Syria,
convoluted these messages. Nonetheless, the political openings and the
electoral victory of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia continue to send the
signal to many Islamist opposition groups that nonviolent means and
participation in politics can be effective ways to produce political change.
The chance of gaining power through electoral means can give Islamists
strong incentives to join in the demands for democratic institutions and
change their stance towards political participation. The appeal of
nonviolent tactics, however, is undermined when external threats
surpass domestic considerations. When the primary concern of the public
is about outside threats and the main enemy is external rather than a
domestic despot, the impact of the Arab Spring on views regarding the
efficacy of nonviolent tactics is diminished. Similarly, when an Islamic
group is primarily concerned with the "far enemy," the incentives for
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The Impact of the Arab Spring on 
Islamist Strategies
Ioana Emy Matesan
Syracuse University
Introduction
The speed with which protests spread and regimes crumbled across the 
Middle East and North Africa in 2011 surprised many scholars and forced 
them to reflect on why their theories hadn't predicted the Arab Spring. 
Abstract
The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt created a contagion effect that 
inspired a series of uprisings by sending two signals: first, that even 
entrenched authoritarian regimes are vulnerable; and second, that nonvi-
olent tactics can be effective in bringing about dramatic political changes. 
Subsequent developments, especially in Libya and Syria, convoluted these 
messages. Nonetheless, the political openings and the electoral victory of 
Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia continue to send the signal to many Islam-
ist opposition groups that nonviolent means and participation in politics 
can be effective ways to produce political change. The chance of gaining 
power through electoral means can give Islamists strong incentives to join 
in the demands for democratic institutions and change their stance 
towards political participation. The appeal of nonviolent tactics, however, 
is undermined when external threats surpass domestic considerations. 
When the primary concern of the public is about outside threats and the 
main enemy is external rather than a domestic despot, the impact of the 
Arab Spring on views regarding the efficacy of nonviolent tactics is dimin-
ished. Similarly, when an Islamic group is primarily concerned with the 
"far enemy," the incentives for moderation offered by political participa-
tion are undermined.
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This trend is all too reminiscent of the scholarly debates after the fall of 
communism in Eastern Europe, when the rapid turn of events surpassed 
theoretical expectations. However, in the early 1990s, the international 
community was euphoric at the prospect of a "democratic domino effect" 
and believed that the fall of communism signaled the dawn of a new era 
for international security. While there was initially much enthusiasm 
about an Arab wave of democratization, policymakers and scholars 
remain much less certain about the impact of the Arab Spring on regional 
and international security. This article seeks to tackle this issue by exam-
ining the impact of the Arab Spring on the strategies of Islamist groups 
that have employed violent tactics to pursue their goals. The article argues 
that the political openings and the electoral victory of Islamists in Egypt 
and Tunisia continue to send the signal to Islamist opposition groups that 
nonviolent means and participation in politics can be more effective than 
violent insurrection. However, when the primary concern is about outside 
threats and the main enemy is external rather than a domestic despot, the 
impact of the Arab Spring on views regarding the efficacy of nonviolent 
tactics is diminished.
The first section of the article briefly examines the dynamics of contagion 
effects and why the protests spread so rapidly across the Middle East and 
North Africa. Understanding the mechanisms of the revolutionary cas-
cade is important because it signals that nonviolent tactics have wide pub-
lic appeal across the region. The second section examines the case of 
Egypt in order to explore how the political changes in the region have 
made nonviolent strategies particularly appealing to Islamist groups. The 
third section reflects upon the limitations of this contagion effect, consid-
ering the impact of the Arab Spring in the Palestinian Territories and 
drawing some comparisons to other cases.
Then and Now: Dominoes, Cascades and the Spread 
of Nonviolent Resistance
Before the events of 2011, many political scientists who studied the Mid-
dle East and North Africa tended to believe in the durability of authoritar-
ianism in the region.1 It comes as no surprise, then, that area specialists 
are now asking where they went wrong.2 At the Middle East Studies Asso-
ciation annual convention in 2011, one of the best-attended panels forced 
scholars to rethink their theories and question what had became almost 
conventional thinking (the panel was entitled "The Stability of the 
Authoritarian Arab Regime?"). Still, such an element of surprise is not a 
new phenomenon for academics. Only two decades ago, scholars studying 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were asking almost identical ques-
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tions. In 1991, Timur Kuran suggested that revolutions are inherently dif-
ficult to predict because of the interaction of social and psychological 
factors.3 His explanation of how protests escalate lies in the argument 
that individuals participating in protests can set off a chain reaction that 
can generate a revolutionary bandwagon by making people believe that 
removing a regime is a possibility.
This argument is still highly relevant today, as we seek to understand the 
rapid spread of demonstrations across the Middle East. Drawing on 
insights from Patel, Bunce, and Wolchick,4 Eva Bellin suggests that two 
logics are at work in the contagion effect that we have witnessed in the 
Arab Spring: the logic of deliberate diffusion, which refers to the con-
scious sharing of tactics by activists; and the logic of the demonstration 
effect, which suggests that successful precedents can set off waves of opti-
mism and euphoria that become more powerful than rational consider-
ations about risks and benefits.5 In addition to this emotional dimension, 
however, Bellin recognizes that the sense of impunity played a crucial 
role, and that demonstrations spread drastically once people in Tunisia 
realized that the army would not shoot.6
Building on these arguments, Bellin's theories suggest that events in 
Tunisia set off a chain reaction in the region by sending two signals: first, 
that even entrenched authoritarian regimes are vulnerable and sensitive 
to public pressures; and second, that nonviolent tactics can be effective in 
bringing about dramatic political changes. Revolutions ultimately occur 
because of specific local grievances. Nonetheless, the ignition can be 
sparked by events outside of the country when they send the signal that 
public pressure is indeed effective and when they raise public suspicion 
about the resilience of the regime.
Simply seeing people protesting is not enough. Before the January 2011 
events in Tunisia, there had been significant, prolonged protests in 
Greece that received international media attention, yet they didn't spark 
any revolutionary cascades. The protests in Iran in 2009, which were 
crushed by the regime, also didn't spark any regional revolutions. Egypt 
experienced regular demonstrations staged by groups such as the Kefaya 
movement or the workers in Mahala well before the events in Tunisia, yet 
these mobilizations did not explode into a revolutionary movement. Tuni-
sia ignited the revolutionary spark when it sent the signal that the military 
can be on the side of the people and that regimes can be toppled. Looking 
at the sequence of events, the protests in Tunisia started in December 
2010 and escalated into January 2011, but Egypt did not emulate these 
demonstrations until after Tunisian President Ben Ali fled the country. In 
fact, only three days after the Tunisian President was ousted, on January 
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17, an Egyptian man set himself on fire near the parliament building in 
Cairo,7 and activists started planning a "day of anger."8 Similarly, events 
in Egypt did not immediately spark sustained protests in other countries 
until it became clear that the Egyptian army was not taking Mubarak's 
side and that the president had resigned. Thus, the revolutionary zeal in 
Tunisia and Egypt became contagious when it sent the signal that nonvio-
lent demonstrations can be effective and that regimes are more vulnera-
ble than people perceived them to be. From this perspective, then, the 
initial message that Tunisia and Egypt sent to other government opposi-
tion movements across the region was that nonviolent resistance can be 
more effective and less costly than often assumed or perceived, especially 
when the military does not support a regime unconditionally.9
Scholars have identified several mechanisms through which nonviolent 
resistance becomes effective. Nonviolent action can produce revolution-
ary political change by undermining the power, resources, and legitimacy 
of the state.10 Stephan and Chenoweth argue that nonviolent tactics 
enhance the domestic and international legitimacy of their protagonists 
and encourage broad-based participation. This level of mobilization also 
implies increased pressure on the regime and makes violent suppression 
more costly and more likely to backfire.11 The repression of unarmed 
civilians, unlike the repression of armed insurrections, can increase com-
mitment to the struggle, lead to divisions with the political elites and 
security forces, and raise international pressures against the regime.12 In 
their large-N analysis that compares the effectiveness of violent and non-
violent resistance worldwide, Stephan and Chenoweth find that nonvio-
lent strategies have been successful 53 percent of the time, compared to 
the 26 percent success rate of violent strategies.13
Within the context of the Arab Spring, since the revolutions in Egypt and 
Tunisia, the brutal repression in Libya and Syria raised doubts about the 
effectiveness of nonviolent tactics. The setbacks in the rest of the region 
demonstrate that, in spite of the contagion effect on the side of activists 
and masses pushing for democratization, outcomes are determined not 
just by the strength of the pro-democratic forces. The turn of events is 
also shaped by the stance of the military, the extent to which political 
actors who seek to maintain the status quo push back, and the willingness 
of the revolt to fight the powers that be. As Kriesberg points out, one of 
the dangers of a wave of protests of the type witnessed during the Arab 
Spring is that the messages being diffused can be misguided; activists 
might overestimate their impact or have overly ambitious goals, whereas 
governments might underestimate the backlash to violent suppression.14
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Countries like Libya, Syria, and Bahrain have proven that regimes in the 
Middle East vary greatly in terms of their security apparatus, repressive 
capabilities, external support, and actors who have a stake in the status 
quo. Bellin suggests that what has been crucial in determining the out-
comes of the demonstrations has been the military's will to stand by the 
regime or to defect. Consistent with Bellin's main arguments, this deci-
sion is determined by the dynamics of social mobilization and by the 
structural character of the military. When the opposition is unified and 
representative of the entire nation, and when it pursues nonviolent tac-
tics, it becomes much more difficult for the military to justify violent 
repression. However, the will to shoot also depends on the character of 
the military: when the armed forces are organized along patrimonial lines 
and perceive their interests as linked to the survival of the regime, they 
will be much more likely to repress the population. According to Bellin, 
this has been the case with Bahrain, where most military units are pre-
dominately Sunni, thus needing the patrimony of the Sunni-dominated 
government to survive; these units are bolstered by both mercenaries 
from abroad and deployed Saudi troops.15 Syria is another example: the 
majority of government and military forces belong to the Alawite clan—a 
minority in the largely Sunni population—and it was mostly Alawi units 
repressing the population.16
Independent of what factors account for the divergent outcomes in the 
region, an important question is whether the lasting message of the Arab 
Spring is that opposition groups are more inspired by nonviolent resis-
tance or by violent models. This article proposes that one of the powerful 
signals sent in the region by these events is that nonviolent resistance can 
be more effective than violent insurgency for Islamist opposition groups. 
The next section develops this argument by examining developments in 
Egypt since the January 25 revolution and focusing on the case of al-
Jama'a al-Islamiyya, an Islamist group in Egypt.
Political Openings and Incentives for Nonviolence
The large masses converging on Tahrir Square on January 25 surprised 
everyone, including the Egyptian security apparatus. Although reports 
indicate that police responded with live ammunition and that militants in 
the Sinai attacked police and international oil pipelines, the January 25 
movement remained nonviolent.17
By the summer of 2011, disillusionment with the lack of political reforms 
set in, leading to a new wave of protests and clashes with the police. Yet, 
in spite of marginal calls to escalate protests, the majority of groups 
Matesan: The Impact of the Arab Spring on Islamist Strategies
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
Journal of Strategic Security
32
involved in the demonstrations continued to call for nonviolent resis-
tance, as well as civil disobedience and a rejection of violent tactics. For 
instance, on July 12 nineteen political parties and coalitions issued a 
joined statement calling for revolutionaries to reject violent acts and use 
only peaceful methods such as strikes, hunger strikes, and civil disobedi-
ence tactics in order to ensure the victory of the revolution and not allow 
the "enemies of the revolution" to promote violence and turn sympathetic 
citizens against change.18
Throughout these developments, Islamist groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, and the Salafist groups present in 
Tahrir Square explicitly disassociated themselves from violence and 
focused on forming political parties and participating in elections. The 
Muslim Brotherhood's rejection of violence and interest in participating 
in free elections under the banner of the Freedom and Justice Party was 
predictable. In its early days, the Brotherhood was associated with some 
violent incidents, and its founder, Hassan al-Banna, was initially hesitant 
to form a political party out of the belief that party competition divided 
the ummah.19 However, the group has since evolved into a nonviolent 
movement, fielding candidates in elections, forming alliances with other 
parties, and developing an increasingly democratic and pluralist political 
platform over the years, despite continued intimidation and repression by 
the regime.20
The rigged November 2010 People's Assembly elections in Egypt marked 
a major political setback for the Muslim Brotherhood. The group lost all 
its seats in the parliament and 1,000 of its members were arrested.21 Left 
with no access to the political system, the Brotherhood had strong incen-
tives to join the January revolution and support the call for democratiza-
tion and free elections. The 2011 election indeed paid off for the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The group headed the Democratic Alliance for Egypt, which 
won 47.2 percent of the seats in the People's Assembly.22
Among the Islamists running for office, the Freedom and Justice Party 
represents the centrist stream. The more conservative Islamists have 
united under the banner of the Islamist block, which comprises Al-Nour, 
Al-Asala, and the Building and Development Party (Al-Binaa Wal-
Tanmiyya). The Islamic block gained 24.7 percent of the seats in the 
recent elections. The establishment of the Building and Development 
Party is a particularly interesting development in post-revolutionary 
Egypt. The party was established as the political wing of al-Jama'a al-
Islamiyya by Tareq Al-Zumar, who until recently was serving a long 
sentence for participating in the assassination of Anwar Sadat.23
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/7
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.2</p>
The Impact of the Arab Spring on Islamist Strategies
33
The Building and Development Party presents itself as an Islamist party 
that takes Islam as the frame of reference, supports implementing shar'ia 
laws, and believes in democracy.24 While the party rejects the separation 
of religion and politics, its leaders pledge not to use violence in dealing 
with any situation or with the state, and to abide by the Egyptian law and 
constitution.25 The party claims that it is ready to deal with non-Islamic 
parties with different beliefs from across the political spectrum, and that 
it welcomes Copts to join their ranks.26 At the same time, however, the 
group rejects the notion of Egypt ever having a Coptic president, arguing 
that asking for a Muslim president to rule a Muslim country is no differ-
ent than England demanding its ruler to be Christian.27
A cynic might suspect that having party membership open to Christians is 
more of a tactical move than a genuine sign of pluralism, especially given 
the fact that the group's petition to form a party was initially rejected 
because its platform was based on religion, which is prohibited by law. In 
the end, the group's appeal was upheld based on the fact that Article 2 of 
the constitution does state that Islamic shar'ia law is the main source of 
legislation, and based on the fact that membership is open to any reli-
gion.28 Whether the Building and Development Party is more or less con-
servative on Coptic or women's rights, the fact that it seeks to participate 
in politics and vows to reject violence and abide by the Egyptian law is of 
great significance, especially given the history of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya.
Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya: From Violence to Deradicalization
Before its renouncement of violence in 1997, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya was 
one of the most violent Islamist groups in Egypt, accounting for the 
majority of terrorist attacks during the 1980s and early 1990s. The group 
first emerged as a major radical actor when it united with the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad and participated in Sadat's assassination on October 6, 
1981. As a result of this attack, many of the Jama'a's members and leaders 
were arrested. These developments incapacitated the group and deterred 
it from staging any major acts of violence during the mid-1980s. How-
ever, the Jama'a resumed its assaults in the late 1980s, after the govern-
ment closed down mosques, banned propagandizing, and arrested large 
numbers of Islamists in the summer of 1987.29 Between 1989 and 1995, 
the group focused on attempting to assassinate prominent Egyptian fig-
ures. This included the assassination of secularist writer Farag Foda (in 
1992), and several unsuccessful attempts on the lives of the Interior Min-
ister (in 1989 and 1990), the Information Minister (in 1993), Nobel laure-
ate Naguib Mahfouz (in 1994), and President Mubarak (in 1995). Starting 
in the mid-1990s, the group began a violent campaign against foreign 
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tourists, which heightened in 1996 and 1997, culminating in the Novem-
ber 17, 1997, Luxor attack, where fifty-seven foreign tourists and ten 
Egyptians were killed.30
What motivated this violence? Inspired by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, al-
Jama'a al-Islamiyya justified the killing of public figures and fellow 
countrymen on the grounds that they were infidels (takfir). Politicians 
were infidels because they accepted secular law, and fellow countrymen 
could lose their status as Muslims if their writings or behavior were seen 
as breaking the Islamic code of conduct.31 Thus, the Jama'a conceived of 
itself as "commanding good and forbidding wrong" (hisba) in order to 
bring Egyptian society as close as possible to Jama'a's interpretation of 
an Islamic society.32 Politics was condemned as being Jahiliyyah (pre-
Islamic), and participation in parliamentary politics was rejected on the 
grounds that it would imply an acceptance of secularism and of the right 
to legislate without Allah.33
The group's main goal was to establish an Islamic society and re-establish 
the caliphate. The group regarded the Brotherhood's focus on preaching 
(da'wa) as a means to do this as too soft and law-abiding.34 Both al-
Jama'a and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad accused the Brotherhood of 
becoming a domesticated movement destined to remain weak as long as it 
participated in politics.35 In their view, what was needed was a vanguard 
to take over state power and radically change society, as this was seen as 
the only viable way to establish a truly Islamic state.36
Given the founding ideology of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya and its violent 
past, the current commitments of its leaders to respect the law and partic-
ipate in politics through the formation of a political party become even 
more significant. It must be noted, however, that the ideological change of 
the al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya did not come about because of the political 
openings after the January 25 revolution; rather, the prospects of free 
election provided the Jama'a with an opportunity to act on its new beliefs.
Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya started changing its radical discourse in 1997, 
when the imprisoned leaders issued a declaration of nonviolence. After 
two years of internal debate, the external and internal leadership issued a 
joint communiqué that fully endorsed the nonviolent initiative. By the 
end of 2008, al-Jama'a had published twenty-six books and numerous 
booklets developing and explaining its ideological revisions and new doc-
trine, and offering a "coherent intellectual and theological position."37
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/7
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.2</p>
The Impact of the Arab Spring on Islamist Strategies
35
The new organizational doctrine emphasized that attempts to uphold high 
standards of morality should not come at the expense of Muslim lives and 
the push for shar'ia law should not compromise the peace or the prosper-
ity of the ummah.38 The group recognized that fighting split the ummah, 
harmed the interests of society, and did not achieve the goals it set out to 
achieve. This meant that it became an action without meaning that would 
be legally forbidden.39 Thus, the notion of takfir was abandoned because 
it led to discord within the community, and the jurisprudence of jihad was 
replaced with the jurisprudence of utility versus injury.40 Furthermore, 
the group also accepted that declaring war or applying penalties can only 
be performed by a ruler and not by any other group or individual.41 The 
concept of hisba was redefined along nonviolent lines, and the group rein-
terpreted it as an obligation to rectify wrongdoings through peaceful 
methods such as preaching.42 Within this new framework, political par-
ticipation was accepted as a legitimate tool for attempting to achieve key 
Islamic objectives such as implementing shar'ia laws and Islamicizing 
society.
The group has justified these ideological revisions on the basis of learning 
and maturing, suggesting that the radical views were based on a simplistic 
reading of religious texts and a poor understanding of the realities of reli-
gion, society, and politics.43 Rashwan argues that this is perfectly plausi-
ble, especially since these ideological revisions displayed much more 
refined theological arguments compared to the early writings, which had 
demonstrated that the leadership did not have a good grasp of the differ-
ent Islamic schools of philosophy and primarily relied on some hard-line 
interpretations.44 This argument about theological learning as a mecha-
nism of deradicalization also has a psychological dimension, as the lead-
ers of the organizations matured from zealous youth to "tempered 
middle-aged people."45
Some scholars regard the deradicalization of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya as a 
form of military defeat that was spurred by the repression and decapita-
tion of the group. Ashour suggests that intense and sustained repression 
led the group to rethink the cost of violent confrontations and the theolog-
ical legitimacy behind its violence.46 He argues that deradicalization 
occurs when such intense and sustained repression is combined with 
selective incentives and a charismatic leadership that is respected and has 
a strong influence over its followers, and when the group is socialized into 
nonviolent norms.47
One can argue that the main lesson learned and the impetus for ideologi-
cal revisions were not primarily about theology or about the cost of vio-
lence, but about the effectiveness of violent tactics as compared to the 
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effectiveness of nonviolent tactics. Indeed a recurring theme in the ideo-
logical revisions is the argument that violence is not cost-effective: jihad is 
forbidden if it is likely to fail, and its practice needs to be evaluated based 
on harm and utility. After years of violent campaigns, which took an 
increasing toll on Muslims, the Jama'a failed to achieve its goal of estab-
lishing an Islamic state, and the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood 
achieved far more success in both Islamicizing society and gaining access 
to the political process through elections. Equally important was the fact 
that public opinion became increasingly critical of the radical cause. As 
Al-Sayyid remarks, the Jama'a had a choice "between armed resistance 
without prospect for success in the short and medium term and use of a 
political process that affords a good opportunity of victory in the medium 
or long term."48
The present political openings in Egypt in the aftermath of the January 25 
revolution and the ability of the Jama'a to establish a political party, par-
ticipate in an Islamic alliance, and win seats in the People's Assembly 
have arguably given the group significantly more influence and legitimacy 
than the years of violent campaigns. Thus, one of the strongest signals 
sent by the Arab Spring to Islamist opposition movements in the region, 
especially in light of Islamist political gains in both Egypt and Tunisia, is 
that nonviolent political participation is a more effective tactic than vio-
lent insurgency. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the recent elec-
toral results in Egypt, it would indeed be very difficult for a group to argue 
that given political openings, political participation is too soft and ineffec-
tive a tactic, and that a violent takeover of the regime is necessary. In 
other words, the Arab Spring and the electoral victory of Islamists can 
serve to discredit radical voices and to give credence to prodemocratic 
forces and to nonviolent Islamist groups that are willing to play by the 
rules and pursue their goals through electoral means. As Elman points 
out, once Islamists participate in the political system, electoral rules that 
provide incentives to appeal to the median voter can continue the trend of 
discrediting radical voices.49
The signal about the effectiveness of nonviolent tactics is likely to rever-
berate across the region, especially since the history of the Jama'a indi-
cates that even radical hard-line groups are adaptable and open to 
learning. They learn not only from their own experience, but also from the 
experience of other Islamist groups inside and outside the country. This 
being said, it is equally important not to fall pray to teleological argu-
ments and to recognize under what circumstances the appeal of nonvio-
lent resistance would be limited.
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Cautious Optimism: Internal versus External 
Threats
The Missing Revolution in the Palestinian Territories
The Palestinian Territories provide an interesting case for reflecting on 
the limitations of the democratic and nonviolent contagion effect set off 
by the Arab Spring. As protests spread across the Middle East and North 
Africa, Palestinians also began organizing in March of 2011, but these 
demonstrations did not escalate into a full-blown revolution and society-
wide mobilization.
According to Salem, sixty new groups of Palestinian youth have started 
mobilizing through Facebook and Twitter since March 2011.50 What is 
interesting about the Palestinian mobilization efforts is that their mes-
sages have been different than the predominant messages in protests 
across the region, which have all been generally focused on replacing 
authoritarian rulers and democratizing the political system. In Egypt, for 
example, the main message has been clear and simple from day one: the 
people want Mubarak out.51 In the Palestinian Territories, on the other 
hand, the March 15 movement started out by calling for national unity 
and an end to the Fatah-Hamas split, after which it started calling for an 
end to the occupation and the right of return for refugees.52 Thus, the Pal-
estinian demonstrations focused on healing rifts rather than removing a 
regime, and they also combined domestic and external concerns, along 
with demands for both domestic and foreign actors.
On one hand, it seems obvious that Palestinians would be making 
demands that are relevant to their most salient problems, since demon-
strations typically reflect specific local grievances. On the other hand, 
however, when a revolutionary message has multiple dimensions and 
seeks several goals and targets different actors, it is far less likely to mobi-
lize a unified national front, and it is far less likely to be successful.
The slogans of the Palestinian protesters as well as public opinion polls 
show that the unified call for democratization and removal of the regime 
did not resonate in the Palestinian Territories, because the primary con-
cerns of the Palestinian public are the lack of state and the occupation. 
For the public, the primary enemy is not the regime per se, but rather the 
lack of a unified regime and the presence of an external enemy, Israel. 
Public opinion polls from 2011 show that Palestinians considered the cre-
ation of a state, rather than democratization, the most important goal for 
their country.53
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In this context, the public resonance of nonviolent tactics is more limited. 
When it comes to domestic reforms, the Palestinian public is indeed 
pushing for an abandonment of violence and factionalism and calling for 
national reconciliation. This demand was met with some success, as both 
Hamas and Fatah started working towards a unity government in the 
aftermath of the demonstrations. However, given the fact that the public 
seems primarily concerned about the occupation, the lessons from Tuni-
sia and Egypt are hardly applicable. Indeed, in examining public opinion, 
only a slight shift was observable in opposition to armed attacks against 
Israeli civilians after March 2011; there was not a drastic transformation 
of attitudes towards the utility or legitimacy of violence against Israel.54 
When asked about the potential effectiveness of peaceful demonstrations, 
about 60 percent of Gazans and just under 50 percent of West Bankers 
thought that these tactics could speed up the end of the occupation, but 
less than 30 percent of West Bankers and around 45 percent of Gazans 
thought that a peaceful revolt could bring the occupation to an end.55 
Such numbers are important, but not enough to mobilize the entire soci-
ety. In other words, while Tunisia and Egypt inspired Palestinians to get 
out on the streets, the most important signals that led to a contagion 
effect elsewhere in the region (that authoritarian regimes are vulnerable 
and can be toppled through nonviolent resistance) were not as resonant 
for the Palestinian public.
The two major political actors traditionally mobilizing the Palestinian 
population currently each represent "the regime" in West Bank and Gaza 
accordingly. While the public is concerned about the occupation and 
regards Israel as the major threat, Hamas and Fatah are primarily con-
cerned about each other. As Bloom points out, the strategies of the major 
political actors in the Palestinian Territories are primarily determined by 
the dynamics of the competition among them and the continuous attempt 
to "outbid" each other.56
In light of the Arab Spring, Hamas and Fatah might try to outbid each 
other through nonviolent tactics in order to be able to work towards a 
unity government and send the message to the international community 
that they are aligned with the nonviolent spirit of the Arab Spring. Indeed, 
Hamas has declared that the "non-violent approach is part of a strategy 
for our present situation to draw world sympathy to our cause."57 Yet, 
speaking in Tehran, Haniyeh also declared that the group is not willing to 
permanently renounce armed resistance against Israel.58 For smaller 
groups, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, violent tactics and spoiling 
strategies might be the most effective option to undermine Hamas's rule 
in Gaza and Fatah's discourse.
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In the Palestinian context, we can thus identify three conditions that have 
prevented the revolutionary zeal of the Arab Spring from cascading into 
widespread prodemocratic mobilization. First, the Palestinian public is 
relatively more concerned about external threats than their neighbors in 
the region. Second, Palestinians have multiple concerns that extend well 
beyond the lack of democratic governance, and their grievances are tar-
geted at both domestic and foreign actors. Third, the absence of rule of 
law and of effective state institutions provides Palestinian political actors 
with incentives to compete against each other through any means, includ-
ing violence.
The Broader Relevance of External Threats
The issue of external versus internal threats and priorities is relevant 
when considering not just public sentiments, but also the calculations of 
the pro–status quo forces and the considerations of Islamist opposition 
groups. Some scholars have suggested, for example, that a major concern 
that is emerging in the Gulf region is the rise of Shia power and growing 
Iranian influence, which are affecting the responses to demonstrations 
and, ultimately, the course of the Arab Spring.59 This could explain not 
just the decision of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to send 
troops to suppress demonstrations in Bahrain, but also the decision of the 
Bahraini military to defend the monarchy and suppress demonstrations. 
As Barany points out, the Bahraini military is not a national army but 
rather "a fighting force of Sunni Muslims who are charged with protecting 
a Sunni ruling family and Sunni political and business elites in a country 
that majority-Shia Iran has officially claimed as a province since 1957, and 
where about three of every four or five people are Shia."60
External factors can also affect the considerations of Islamist groups. Out-
side of the Middle East and North Africa, the prospects of democratiza-
tion and political participation did not moderate internationally-oriented 
militant groups such as the Indonesian Jama'a Islamiyya, who in the 
aftermath of democratization embarked on a series of violent terrorist 
attacks. Since the 1990s, the group has shifted its focus from domestic 
issues and imposing shar'ia law to targeting the "far enemy," and it has 
developed a multinational constituency and established bases of support 
outside of the country.61 Given this broadening of priorities and constitu-
ency, repression could not fully decapitate the group, and democratiza-
tion did not offer the international constituency enough incentives to 
abandon violent tactics.
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Similar dynamics can also play out in the Middle East for groups that are 
part of global jihadist networks and are primarily focused on the far 
enemy rather than on implementing domestic shar'ia laws and Islamiciz-
ing a national audience. Broad internationalist goals such as establishing 
a caliphate, however, are difficult if not impossible to reach. Therefore, as 
groups with more limited and domestic-oriented goals make progress in 
reforming society and local or national laws to reflect Islamic principles, 
even internationally oriented groups can learn and adapt accordingly. If 
such learning occurs, the scales can tip in the favor of nonviolent resis-
tance in the long run.
Conclusion
The initial victories in Tunisia and Egypt sent a strong and important sig-
nal that nonviolent tactics can be effective and bring about political 
change. As demonstrations spread across the region, their success has 
been mixed, reinforcing the fact that outcomes are determined not just by 
the number and power of protesters but also by the strength and resolve 
of the regime and pro–status quo forces. Even in light of setbacks, how-
ever, the recent electoral wins of Islamist parties continue to send a strong 
signal that nonviolent Islamist strategies can be more effective than vio-
lent insurgencies. In considering the future of the Arab Spring and of 
democratization in the region, it is important to keep in mind not just 
domestic considerations but also external threats and regional dynamics.
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